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Construction of the 21st Century
Maritime Silk Road: Present
Situation, Opportunities, Problems
and Solutions
He Fan, Zhu He, Zhang Qian*

Abstract:

The 21st Century Maritime Silk Road is an important part of China’s new
landscape of all-round opening-up, responding to the joint demands of both
China and many countries in Southeast Asia, South Asia and Africa. This
paper examines countries and regions along the 21st Century Maritime Silk
Road and makes an in-depth study of their typical economic conditions,
opportunities for cooperation with China, as well as related existing
problems. There are opportunities in five areas for China to further cooperate
with relevant countries and regions; industrial investment, infrastructure
investment, resource development, overseas economic & trade zones and
maritime economic development. There are also three outstanding problems;
poor coordination among executive agents, insufficient financial support
and lack of a sound and complete talent team. This paper offers several
suggestions concerning the construction of the 21st Century Maritime Silk
Road to better fit the national conditions and joint demands of China and the
countries and regions involved.

Keywords: Belt and Road Initiative; the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road; infrastructure;
financial support

D

uring President Xi Jinping’s state visits to Kazakhstan and Indonesia, in
September and October 2013, he successively proposed the building of
the “Silk Road Economic Belt” and the “21st Century Maritime Silk Road,” which
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were later combined by the Chinese government
to form the Belt and Road Initiative. Since then,
the Chinese government has developed a series
of policies and strategies to advance the initiative
including: the Silk Road Fund (2014), the Asian
Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB, 2015),
the Vision and Actions on Jointly Building the
Silk Road Economic Belt and the 21st Century
Maritime Silk Road, jointly issued by multiple
ministries and commissions (March, 2015); and
the Vision for Maritime Cooperation Under the
Belt and Road Initiative jointly issued by National
Development and Reform Commission and State
Oceanic Administration (June, 2017). The Belt and
Road Forum for International Cooperation was
held in May 2017 in Beijing, with participants from
over 130 countries and more than 70 international
organizations. The For um issued the Joint
Communique of the Leaders Roundtable of the Belt
and Road Forum for International Cooperation,
and the List of Achievements of the Belt and Road
Forum for International Cooperation.
Since the proposal of the Belt and Road Initiative,
most relevant countries have officially expressed their
endorsement. A popular criticism against the Belt
and Road Initiative is that it is the Chinese version of
the Marshall Plan and that the purpose is to enhance
its diplomatic clout, for which China’s cooperation
with other developing countries (particularly those in
underdeveloped regions) is believed to be assistance
at all costs.
Such a view misunderstands China’s original
intention for proposing the Belt and Road Initiative
and exposes their lack of understanding of China’s
current economic development. From the mid19th Century to the early 20th Century, a massive
outbound investment fever sweep the UK—the
superpower of the global economy at that time. At
the peak of that fever, the UK’s outbound investments
accounted for 5% of its national revenue, half of its
22

domestic savings went abroad and the proportion
of its outbound investment’s real return in national
revenue rose from 5% to 8%. That outbound
investment covered a range of sectors, public utilities
(railway, highway, water & power infrastructure,
telegram, etc.) in multiple countries and regions.
Why did such a massive outbound investment tide
take place? One important reason lies in the fact that
within the UK at the time, investment opportunities
were on the decline, the marginal income ratio kept
dropping, the demographic dividend was shrinking,
and the pace of productivity improvement was
slowing. Under such circumstances, domestic
capital cast their eyes over emerging economies like
the USA, Australia, Canada and South America
(Edelstein, 1982).
In a way, China is facing the same real challenges
as those faced by the UK. Having experienced over
40 years of sustained growth, the Chinese economy
has moved from the stage of rapid growth to the
stage of New Normal, which features excess savings,
significant pressures for industrial restructuring
and a decreasing return on investments. Against
this backdrop, China timely proposed the Belt and
Road Initiative, which is a demonstration of its
active adaptation to and management of the New
Normal. Internationally, the global economy is in a
slow recovery and anti-globalization sentiment is on
the rise. The Belt and Road Initiative, proposed by
the Chinese government, aims to inject new vigor
to boot the global economy by promoting regional
cooperation.
With four-years of effort, the Belt and Road
Initiative has yielded fruitful results. Judging from the
already generated effects, the Chinese government
has made significant progress in advancing the Belt
and Road Initiative and gained extensive recognition
in the international community. So far, China, in
collaboration with 20 countries along the Belt and
Road, has built 56 economic and trade cooperation
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zones. And China’s centrally-administered SOEs
(small and medium-sized enterprises) have taken
the initiative to participate in advancing the Belt
and Road Initiative mainly through infrastructure
(railway, highway, telecommunication network,
etc.) and energy resource cooperation, industrial
investment and (industry) zone construction. So
far, substantial progress and tangible results have
been made in these areas. For example, China
Communications Construction Company Limited
(CCCC) has undertaken port construction in
multiple countries, including Myanmar, Bangladesh,
Malaysia, Singapore and Sri Lanka. And China’s
financial support to the Belt and Road Initiative
is enormous. As of the end of 2016, the AIIB had
provided a total of USD 1.7 billion in loans for nine
projects. China has invested USD 40 billion to enable
the establishment of the Silk Road Fund. Also as of
the end of 2016, China’s promised investment had
reached USD 6 billion and had concluded RMB
982.2 billion currency swaps with 22 countries
and regions along the Belt and Road (Office of the
Leading Group on Advancing the Belt and Road
Initiative, 2017).
This paper analyzes current development, key
opportunities and existing problems facing the
construction of the 21st Century Maritime Silk
Road (hereinafter referred to as the Maritime Silk
Road) and proposes corresponding measures to the
Chinese government. So far, more than 50 countries
along the Maritime Silk Road have expressed their
willingness to support and participate in this cause.
Those countries are in different regions at varied
development levels. To ensure more focused study,
the analytical framework of this paper only includes
countries fulfilling the following four conditions:
(1) developing country (per capita income: c. USD
8,000); (2) a country along one of the three routes
covered by Vision for Maritime Cooperation under
the Belt and Road Initiative; (3) country officially

expressing support and willingness to join the Belt and
Road Initiative; and (4) country maintaining in-depth
economic and trade communications with China.
This paper includes 21 countries in four regions.
Southeast Asia; Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand, the
Philippines, Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos and Myanmar.
South Asia; Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh and
Maldives. The Middle East and North Africa; Egypt,
Algeria, Morocco and Sudan. East Africa; Djibouti,
Ethiopia, Kenya, Tanzania and Mozambique.

1. A review of common features
concerning countries and regions
along the Maritime Silk Road
Over the past 30 years, the US dollar-dominated
international division of labor has gradually taken
shape. The process of product manufacturing has
gone beyond a “national economy” to merge in
the “multinational corporation’s global production
network extensively connecting almost every corner
of the world.” Accordingly, production factors
like resources, manpower and technology have
accelerated their flow across the globe, bringing the
entire world closer. Most of the countries along the
Maritime Silk Road are new economies with huge
economic potential. Although these countries differ
in economic size, population and industrial structure,
common features can still be found, including
satisfactory economic growth, great economic
potential, and relatively backward infrastructure.
1.1 Satisfactory economic growth
In recent years, the economic growth of countries
and regions along the Maritime Silk Road has
been satisfactory, which is mainly reflected in their
economic growth rate and urbanization. As shown
in Table 1, in 2016, all relevant countries, except
Morocco, witnessed a year-on-year GDP increase
which was 2.2% higher than the global average; the
average increase rates of Southeast Asia, South Asia
23
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and East Africa were all higher than 5%. Seen over a
longer period (the past 5-10 years), the average annual
growth rates of both Southeast Asia and East Africa
were both higher than 6%, and the average growth
rate of South Asia was close to 5%. By contrast,
the Middle East and North Africa, however, for
geopolitical and regional security reasons, failed to
keep up with the other regions in economic growth,
but managed to maintain their growth range at the
global average level.
Urbanization differs from region to region.
The overall development trend remains stable, with
development speed differing slightly among regions.
The Middle East and North Africa have the highest
urbanization rate (≥ 50%), followed by Southeast
Asia (average 43.9% in 2015). However, urbanization
rates vary from country to country in South East
Asia, with Malaysia topping the list (over 70%) and
Cambodia at the bottom (20%). South Asia and East
Africa feature lower urbanization rates (respectively
34.3% and 36.7% in 2015). In terms of development
trends, in the past five years, all relevant countries
and regions have maintained a steady rise in their
urbanization rates. Southeast Asia has witnessed
rapid growth, with its average annual urbanization
rate growing by 3.4%. The figure for Thailand and
Laos reached 6%. Second comes South Asia, with an
average 3% rise in the urbanization rate. The Middle
East, North Africa and East Africa have suffered a
low rise in this regard, achieving a mere 1.7% rise

over the past five years. However, this has a lot to do
with the already relatively high urbanization levels
in the Middle East and North Africa while local
deteriorating security conditions have also hampered
their speed of increasing urbanization.
1.2 Huge development potential
The second common feature shared by countries
and regions along the Maritime Silk Road is their
huge development potential. In fact, the economic
performances of these countries and regions have
partially proven their potential. As shown in Table 1,
except for a few countries, most still struggle with a
relatively low urbanization rate (30%-40%). Despite
that, relevant countries have great advantages in
population age structure and labor competence,
which form a solid basis for rapid economic
development in the future. In Southeast Asia, the age
group of 15-59 years accounts for 66.9% of the total
population on average, with the figures for Malaysia,
Vietnam and Thailand respectively being 70%, 70%
and 71.7%. In South Asia and Middle East & North
Africa, the age group of 15-59 years respectively
account for 65.1% and 64.4% of the total population.
In East Africa, however, the age group of 15-59 years
accounts for only 55.7% of the total population. Such
a distribution has a lot to do with region-specific
conditions. According to the World Health Statistics
2016 issued by WHO, the average life expectancy
in East Africa was only 62 years and this figure in
Tanzania was even lower, only 55 years.

Table 1 Economic and Social Indicators of Countries along the Maritime Silk Road

Region

Southeast
Asia

24

Country

The Proportion
Recent
Average
Proportion of Engineering
Recent
Per
10
proportion Schooling
of
and
Port
2016 5 Years’
Highway
Logistics
Capita
Years’
2010
2015
of
Years of
Population Transportation
Facility
GDP Average
Density
Performance
GDP
Average Urbanization Urbanization Population Population
with
Equipment
Index
growth GDP
Per 100
Index
(USD,
GDP
Rate
Rate
Aged 15- Aged at
Access to Investment in
(1-7,
(%) Growth
km2
(1-5, 2016)
2016)
Growth
59
and Over
Electricity Manufacturing
2016)
(%)
(%)
15 (2010)
(%, 2014) Value Added
(%, 2012)

Malaysia 9503 4.24 5.08

4.79

71.0%

75.0%

69.1%

10.44

Indonesia 3570 5.02 5.30

5.59

50.0%

54.0%

67.2%

7.61

47
(2011)
26
(2011)

100

29.4

3.4

5.6

97

20.2

2.6

3.8
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Region

Country

The Proportion
Recent
Average
Proportion of Engineering
Recent
Per
10
proportion Schooling
of
and
Port
2016 5 Years’
Highway
Logistics
Capita
Years’
2010
2015
of
Years of
Population Transportation
Facility
GDP Average
Density
Performance
GDP
Average Urbanization Urbanization Population Population
with
Equipment
Index
growth GDP
Per 100
Index
(USD,
GDP
Rate
Rate
Aged 15- Aged at
Access to Investment in
(1-7,
(%) Growth
km2
(1-5, 2016)
2016)
Growth
59
and Over
Electricity Manufacturing
2016)
(%)
(%)
15 (2010)
(%, 2014) Value Added
(%, 2012)

Thailand 5908 3.23 3.41

3.19

44.0%

50.0%

71.7%

45.0%

44.0%

63.6%

30.0%

34.0%

70.0%

6.58

20.0%

21.0%

64.3%

2353 7.02 7.59

7.74

33.0%

39.0%

61.7%

Myanmar 1275 6.50 7.51

8.56

31.0%

34.0%

67.5%

3627 5.75 6.07

6.01

40.5%

43.9%

66.9%

Pakistan 1468 5.74 4.61

3.68

37.0%

39.0%

60.6%

Sri Lanka 3835 4.38 4.61

3.68

18.0%

18.0%

66.0%

6.45

6.24

30.0%

34.0%

66.1%

Maldives 8602 4.09 4.03

5.35

40.0%

46.0%

67.9%

Average

3816 5.33 4.93

4.74

31.3%

34.3%

65.1%

Egypt

3514 4.30 3.20

4.18

43.0%

43.0%

61.2%

Algeria

3844 3.70 3.48

3.13

68.0%

71.0%

65.4%

3.14

3.85

58.0%

60.0%

66.5%

Average

3397 3.03 3.27

3.72

56.3%

58.0%

64.4%

Sudan

2415 4.67 3.43

4.12

33.0%

34.0%

56.5%

Djibouti 1862 9.00 4.47

4.62

77.0%

77.0%

63.3%

707 7.56 9.49 10.22

17.0%

19.0%

55.6%

Kenya

1455 5.85 5.47

5.23

24.0%

26.0%

55.5%

Tanzania

879 6.96 6.45

6.67

28.0%

32.0%

51.6%

Mozambique 382 3.85 6.66

6.70

31.0%

32.0%

51.5%

1283 6.32 6.00 6.26

35.0%

36.7%

55.7%

The
2951 6.92 6.58 5.61
Philippines
Vietnam 2186 6.21 5.91 6.04
Southeast
Cambodia 1270 6.88 7.15
Asia
Laos

Average

South
Asia Bangladesh 1359 7.11

Middle
East &
North
Africa

Morocco 2832 1.10

Ethiopia
East
Africa

Average

35
(2006)
67
8.43
(2003)
7.15
N/A
22
4.72
(2009)
17
5.02
(2011)
6
4.85
(2011)
7.03
31
33
5.02
(2011)
173
10.06
(2010)
166
5.91
(2003)
29
6.02
(2005)
6.75
100
14
7.15
(2010)
5
6.68
(2010)
13
4.96
(2011)
6.26
11.6
0.5
3.21
(2000)
13
N/A
(2000)
4
N/A
(2007)
28
6.14
(2011)
3.8
5.81
(2009)
9
1.93
(2011)
4.27
9.7
7.99

100

30.5
(2011)

3.1

4.5

89

48.2

2.6

3.2

99

16.2
0.13
(2000)

2.7

3.9

2.4

3.7

56
78

N/A

1.8

2.2

52

N/A

2.3

2.6

84

28.5
5.22
(1990)

2.6

3.7

2.7

4.1

98
92

2.1

2.2
(2014)

4.3

62

2.26
(2011)

2.5

3.6

100

N/A

2.6

N/A

88

2.1

2.6

4.0

100

3.8

3.1

4.3

100

19.3
(2009)

2.6

3.0

92

6.0

2.5

4.8

97

4.9

2.7

4.0

45

N/A

2.2

N/A

47

N/A

2.3

N/A

27

6.0

2.1

3.2

36

2.6

3.2

4.2

15

N/A

2.8

3.4

21

N/A

2.2

3.6

31

4.3

2.5

3.6

Notes: Some figures in the table are followed with a bracket, inside which is the year of the latest figure retrievable; N/A
indicates no relevant figure available.
Data source: The World Bank database, Ministry of Commerce of the PRC, National Bureau of Statistics, State
Administration of Foreign Exchange 2015 Statistical Bulletin of China’s Outward Foreign Direct Investment,
Barro-Lee Education Attainment Dataset.
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In terms of labor competence, Southeast Asia
and South Asia are at the leading level, with their
average schooling years for 15-year-olds and above
respectively reaching 7.03 years and 6.75 years.
This means that the laboring populations in these
countries have completed most of their secondary
education which is conducive for them to undertake
more mid-range and low-end labor-intensive
industries transferred from elsewhere. There is still
a lot to improve when it comes to labor competence
in the Middle East, North Africa and East Africa.
The average schooling years for 15-year-olds and
above in Middle East and North Africa was only
6.26 years. The figure for East Africa was even
lower at 4.27 years. This can hinder the economic
development of relevant countries. Moreover, it
also indicates that China’s future cooperation with
relevant countries requires local talent training and
competence improvement, as well as more human
& material investments in education. In addition to
labor force advantages, some countries also enjoy
prominent advantages in natural resources which will
be discussed later.
1.3 Relatively poor infrastructure
The third common feature shared by countries
and regions along the Maritime Silk Road is their
poor infrastructure, which is clearly demonstrated
in Table 1. In terms of highway density per 100km2,
South Asia ranks number one, followed by Southeast
Asia. By contrast, the Middle East & North Africa
and East Africa lag behind. Regarding the percentage
of population with access to electricity, East Africa
(32%) is at the bottom. The proportion of engineering
and transportation equipment in manufacturing value
added can reflect a country’s input of resources in
developing logistics. In this regard, Southeast Asia
still has substantial room to improve its logistics. Yet,

significant development imbalance exists within this
region. The average proportions of South Asia, the
Middle East & North Africa are all very low, which
indicates a major challenge facing countries in these
regions in future infrastructure construction.
This is consistent with what is reflected by their
logistics performance indexes (LPI) and port facility
indexes. The average logistics indexes of the four
regions are around 2.6.① Egypt and Malaysia perform
best, ranking among the top players in Africa and
Asia with LPIs of 3.8 and 3.4 respectively. The port
facility indexes are basically in line with the logistics
performance indexes. The two indexes are directly
related to local infrastructure levels, which further
exposes the poor infrastructures of these regions.

2. Five opportunities concerning
Maritime Silk Road construction
2.1 Outbound industrial investment
Countries along the Maritime Silk Road feature
a diversity of industries and have advantages in
agriculture, manufacturing, tourism, garment &
textile, etc. This means many opportunities for
China’s outbound investments. Take the ASEAN
countries for example. In recent years, Malaysia,
through continuous upgrading of its industrial
structure, has formed a new economic structure
with manufacturing, services and tourism being
the three pillar industries. At present, well-known
Chinese IT giants such as Xiaomi and Huawei
are swarming to Malaysia, which is expected to
significantly boost the further development of
local technology and manufacturing. Thailand
has been known as a major agricultural country
and is now one of the top five exporters of
agricultural products. China, as a country with a

① Generally speaking, the drop of 1 LPI (logistics performance index) unit means six more days spent on the import journey from port to company and three
more days spent on the export journey, and also means five times time spent on cargo inspection at the Customs.
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large population, has an urgent need to innovate its
agricultural cultivation technology. Thus, there is
a solid basis for agricultural cooperation between
China and Thailand. Ever since the introduction of
the Belt and Road Initiative, China and Thailand
have further enhanced their cooperation in
agricultural trading. Their good cooperation can
help increase China’s agricultural technology and
grain yields and at the same time lift Thailand’s
economy to a new development stage.
On the South Asian Subcontinent, Bangladesh
has witnessed the most impressive rapid development
over the past years. Featuring a large population
and cheap labor, Bangladesh has a great potential
to develop labor-intensive industries. With the rapid
increase of China’s labor costs, its low value-added
industries like garments & textiles are faced with
huge pressures for survival and therefore require
immediate transformation. Low value-added laborintensive industries are expected to be transferred
from China to Bangladesh, which means an
opportunity for win-win development of the two
countries. Such an industrial transfer can promote
China’s domestic industrial upgrading and help
Bangladesh to increase jobs and boost its economy.
Benefiting from the advancement of the Belt and
Road Initiative, Bangladesh’s tourism has started
to thrive, paving the way for it to raise its national
profile in a new global landscape.
China also enjoys great prospects for industrial
cooperation with Pakistan, Sri Lanka and other
countries. Prior to the introduction of the Belt and
Road Initiative, the construction of the ChinaPakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) had been
placed on the agenda. In 2013, China Overseas
Ports Holding Co., Ltd. acquired the development &
operation rights of Gwadar Port, Pakistan. Located
at the intersection of the Silk Road Economic Belt
and the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road, Gwadar
Port, under the management of the Chinese side, is

gradually developing into an important port along
the Maritime Silk Road and has injected new vigor
into the economy of Pakistan. Thanks to China’s
all-round development of the greater Gwadar Port
region, significant improvements have been made in
residents’ employment, education and healthcare. Sri
Lanka is a country whose economy primarily relies
on plantation and agriculture. Being among the first
countries to endorse China’s Belt and Road Initiative,
Sri Lanka has established a positive partnership
with China. In 2014, China Harbour Engineering
Company Ltd. (CHEC) invested USD 1.4 billion in
the construction of the “Colombo Port City” project,
which is by far the largest foreign invested-project
in Sri Lanka. Port construction is the foundation of
foreign trade and upon completion “Colombo Port
City” is expected to attract USD 20 billion in foreign
investments in 15 years.
2.2 Infrastructure construction
According to the Global Competitiveness Report
2015-2016, issued by the World Economic Forum, the
exponential moving average of global infrastructure
competitiveness was 4.02. Of the countries along
the Belt and Road, only 29 countries, accounting for
not more than half, reached this figure. According to
the study conducted by the Development Research
Center of the State Council (DRC), the infrastructure
investment needed by countries along the Belt and
Road from 2016 to 2020 is estimated to exceed
USD 10.6 trillion. The infrastructure construction of
these countries is tormented by challenges including
lagging technology, low coverage, low efficiency,
poor capital implementation, insufficient technology
and insufficient capital.
For most of the related countries, the lack of
infrastructure is highlighted by poor transportation,
electricity and telecommunication facilities.
Vietnam still suffers from poor transportation
infrastructure and the low coverage of their transport
network. It only has 0.8km of railway per 100km2
27
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and its highway network is far from complete.
Of the total 658 bridges that connect its national
highway network, 173 bridges need to be rebuilt
to ensure safety. The low efficiency of their road
transportation is reflected by the average vehicle
speed of 35km per hour (Yang, 2016). The length of
Thailand railways is 4,363km of which single-track
railways are 3,755km. The average speed of freight
transport is 29km per hour and the average speed
of passenger transport is 50km per hour (Sindaeng,
2017). Such freight and passenger transport
capacities clearly cannot satisfy the need of modern
development. Some countries suffer a severe lack
of electricity. As shown in Table 1, the power grid
coverage of Myanmar, Cambodia, Bangladesh and
Laos were only 52%, 56%, 62% and 78% in 2015.
The power infrastructure in the entire East Africa
region is even worse, with an average power grid
coverage of only 31% in 2015. Worst of all, the
figure for Tanzania was only 15%.
Compared with most countries along the Maritime
Silk Road which suffer severe infrastructure shortage,
China enjoys obvious advantages in infrastructure
construction. It is fair to say that China already has
a sound and complete infrastructure system and
advanced experience in building technologically
challenging projects. China is a vast country with
a diversity of landscapes. By tackling many truly
challenging technological problems in transport
facility construction, China has accumulated rich and
advanced experience in infrastructure construction.
For example, China now has the world’s longest
cross-sea bridge, the Qingdao Bay Bridge, the world’s
highest bridge, the Beipanjiang Bridge (Guizhou),
and the world’s longest cross-plateau railway, the
Qinghai-Tibet Railway. In 2016 China’s annual
railway passenger volume reached 2.814 billion and
the annual railway freight volume reached 3.332
billion tons. Its overall railway transport capacity
is in stark contrast with those of other countries
28

along the Maritime Silk Road. This means China’s
infrastructure construction enterprises are more
capable of tackling technological difficulties in
construction than their partners along the Silk Road.
China is endowed with corresponding capacities and
conditions to extensively cooperate with relevant
countries in infrastructure construction and thereby
explore brand-new models of cooperation in a bid for
win-win results.
2.3 Construction for economic & trade
cooperation zone at overseas
As of the end of 2016, Chinese enterprises
had established 56 zones for economic & trade
cooperation in 20 countries along the Belt and Road.
These zones are mainly engaged in processing &
manufacturing, resource utilization, agricultural
industrialization, commercial logistics, technological
research & development, and comprehensive
development. According to the data platform of the
Ministry of Commerce of the PRC, a total of 17
overseas economic & trade zones built by China
in relevant countries along the Belt and Road have
already been examined and approved. Of those 17
zones, ten are in countries along the Maritime Silk
Road. (Table 2).
Regarding zone types, these zones are now
primarily dominated by enterprises in processing
& manufacturing and agricultural industrialization,
and seldom include those in technological research
& development or comprehensive business. For
example, the Eastern Industry Zone in Ethiopia aims
to develop into a comprehensive commercial & trade
functional zone mainly engaged in export-oriented
manufacturing and processing. Judging from the
existing enterprises there, the Eastern Industry Zone
still mainly covers the sectors of textile, tanning,
agricultural product processing, metallurgy, building
materials and electro-mechanics. Another example
is the Saysettha Comprehensive Development Zone,
which intends to adopt a development model of
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China-Egypt Suez Economic and Trade Cooperation Zone

“industrial zone + new urban area.” The overall
positioning of this project is “one city & four
districts,” namely, Vientiane new industrial eco-town,
demonstration zone jointly developed by China and
Laos, industry supporting zone of Yunnan Province’s
bridgehead strategy, the core zone of Vientiane
sub-center and a livable zone with a harmonious
living environment. At present, most contracting
enterprises are from the sectors of processing and
building materials.
The total investments in these zones have
exceeded USD 18.5 billion and the total output of
these zones has exceeded USD 50 billion. The total
tax contribution to host countries has exceeded USD
1.1 billion and the total jobs created locally have

exceeded 180,000. Take China-Egypt Suez Economic
and Trade Cooperation Zone as another example. The
development of its phase I project, covering an area
of 1.34km2, has already been completed. Now, the
phase I zone has 70 member enterprises, total agreed
investment of close to USD 1 billion, an annual sales
volume of USD 180 million and a total import-export
volume of USD 290 million. In 2012 China Jushi Co.,
Ltd, the world’s largest fiberglass producer opened a
plant inside the Zone, making it the first and also the
only world-class fiberglass production base in Africa.
This plant helps Egypt advance industrial upgrading
and increase jobs while at the same time motivates
Chinese enterprises to go global, thus generating
win-win results.
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Table 2 Overview of China’s Overseas Economic & Trade Cooperation Zones in Countries along the Maritime Silk
Road
Name of domestic
Major industries
enterprise
Taihu Cambodia International
Cambodia Sihanoukville Special
Garment & textile, suitcases & leatherware,
Economic Cooperation Zone
Economic Zone
hardware & machinery, wood products, etc.
Investment Co. Ltd. (Jiangsu)
Thai-Chinese Rayong Industrial
Auto parts, machinery, household appliances,
Holley Group
Zone
etc.
Longjiang Industrial Park
Qianjiang Investment
(Vietnam)
Management Co., Ltd.
Haier-Ruba Economic Zone
Haier Electronics Group Co., Household appliances, automobile, textile,
(HREZ, Pakistan)
Ltd.
building materials, chemical engineering, etc.
Garment & textile, oil equipment, high- &
China-Egypt Suez Economic and China-Africa TEDA
low-voltage apparatus, new building materials,
Trade Cooperation Zone
Investment Co., Ltd.
fine chemical engineering
Texitle, tanning, agro-product
Jiangsu Yongyuan Investment
Eastern Industry Zone (Ethiopia)
processing, metallurgy, building materials,
Co., Ltd.
electromechanical industry
Energy and chemical engineering, agriculture
Vientiane Saysettha
& livestock product processing, electric product
Yunnan Provincial Overseas
Comprehensive Development
processing, feed processing, tobacco processing,
Investment Co., Ltd.
Zone (Laos)
building material technology, logistics &
warehousing, etc.
Nonferrous metal mining & smelting,
Zambia-China Economic &
China Nonferrous Metal
processing, derivatives, building materials &
Trade Cooperation Zone
Mining (Group) Co., Ltd.
supporting industries
Lekki Free Zone-China-Nigeria
China-Africa Lekki
Manufacturing, logistics & warehousing, real
Economic & Trade Cooperation
Investment Ltd.
estate development, etc.
Zone
China-Indonesia Julong
Oil palm planting & development, deepAgricultural Industry
Julong Group (Tianjin)
processing, purchase, logistics & warehousing
Cooperation Zone
Name of cooperation zone

Category
Processing and
manufacturing
Processing and
manufacturing
Processing and
manufacturing
Processing and
manufacturing

Comprehensive

Comprehensive

Industry

Comprehensive
Agricultural
industry

Data source: Official website of the Ministry of Commerce of the PRC & relevant overseas cooperation zones

At present, overseas construction for economic
& trade cooperation zone follows a model which
consists of three steps. In the first step, zone builders
attract, and help interested enterprises move into the
zone. According to the Model Service Directory for
Overseas Economic & Trade Cooperation Zones,
zone builders should offer the following services
to member enterprises; information consultation,
operation & management, property management and
emergency services. The whole admission process
consists of field visits―preliminary agreement―
registration & licensing―land renting/purchase―
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trial production. All zones should provide onestop services. In addition, many zones also offer
administrative services, which allow member
enterprises to complete the admission process
within a zone and thus save costs. In the second
step, member enterprises, supported by preferential
policies, go into operation. Member enterprises can
usually enjoy multiple tax preference items. For
example, the China-Indonesia Economic and Trade
Cooperation Zone provides its member enterprises
with six tax preference items concerning the EU
generalized system of preferences (GSP), import
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tariff, tax convenience, export rebate, bonded area
and non-foreign exchange control. Apart from
superimposed tax preferences, there is also an
industry-specific system of tax preferences. An
example of this can be found in the Thai-Chinese
Rayong Industrial Zone, where member enterprises
are classified into six levels (A1-A4 & B1-B2) and
enjoy level-based tax preferences. Enterprises that
fall into the A1 level (knowledge-intensive industries)
and A2 level (high-tech industries) can enjoy the
largest tax preferences. In the third step, finished
products are sold smoothly. Again take the Eastern
Industry Zone in Ethiopia as an example, which
pioneered a “contract of purchase” model. More
specifically, the Eastern Industry Zone has already
concluded a contract of purchase with relevant
authorities in Ethiopia. According to the contract, the
Ethiopian government will purchase products from
member enterprises inside the Zone. This means a
new sales channel for its member enterprises.
Overall, satisfactory progress has been made in
China’s existing economic & trade cooperation zones
abroad. However, the overall level of those overseas
zones remains preliminary. After all, not many
zones can compare with the Haier-Ruba Economic
Zone (HREZ) in Pakistan in terms of brand effect
and overseas markets. Therefore, regarding overseas
zone construction, there is much to improve both
in scope and depth. Many economic and trade
zone overseas, though positioned as comprehensive
industrial parks, are still at an early-development
stage and mainly cover businesses such as garments
& textiles, agricultural product processing and
building materials. In later development stages, it is
better to introduce more diversified enterprises and
give full play to the scale effect formed by member
enterprises. In terms of the business model, focus
should be given to the introduction of financial
institutions and the establishment of more convenient
financing platforms. In this regard, Sihanoukville

Special Economic Zone (SSEZ) in Cambodia has
set a very good example. At the production stage,
sector-specific tax preferences can be applied to
fulfill initial zone planning and layout. At the product
sales stage, member enterprises within a zone can
work together to expand sales channels, such as
collectively conclude a contract of purchase with
local government authorities or enterprises.
2.4 Cooperation in resource development
Of the countries and regions along the Maritime
Silk Road, many possess obvious advantages in
natural resources. Adhering to the principle of mutual
benefit, China should seize the strategic opportunity
of cooperation in resource development and should
take the initiative to cooperate with other countries
in sustainable development and utilization of natural
resources. In terms of mineral reserves, several Asian
countries are high on the list. Indonesia ranks number
two worldwide in tin ore reserves, accounting for
17.02% of global reserves. Indonesia also has rich
coal reserves. As of 2016, its proven coal reserves
accounted for 2.2% of global reserves. In 2015 its
coal output reached 469 million tons. Malaysia ranks
number five in xenotime reserves and number seven
in thorium ore reserves. Vietnam ranks number
13 in titanium ore reserves. Mozambique ranks
number nine in titanium ore reserves and number
three in zirconium ore reserves. Sri Lanka ranks
number seven in xenotime reserves. When it comes
to agricultural resources, Indonesia, Malaysia and
Thailand have remained the top three players in palm
oil output. In 2016 Pakistan emerged as the world’s
third largest producer of cottonseed.
When expanding overseas, Chinese enterprises
now mainly follow six patterns (Qiu & Zhu, 2011).
The first pattern is a Sino-foreign joint venture,
which means Chinese enterprises co-invest with local
enterprises to set up a resource developer. Chinese
enterprises can choose a preferred investment form
and amount according to their own risk tolerance
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and then provide project design, equipment and other
services. The second pattern is capacity purchase,
which means Chinese enterprises inject capital
in an overseas resource developer and in return
the developer supplies resources to the Chinese
enterprise. The third pattern is merger and acquisition
(M&A), which means Chinese enterprises, by
means of purchasing the shares of overseas resource
developers, acquire a controlling stake, possess longterm exclusive selling rights for mining products and
carry resource products back to China. The fourth
pattern is risk exploration, which means Chinese
enterprises acquire the rights of resource exploration
and mining from a host country. The fifth pattern is
lease operation, which means Chinese enterprises
operate independently for a certain number of
years on a lease basis. The sixth pattern is resource
exchange, which means Chinese enterprises, by
virtue of their brand influence and other strengths,
provide “funded construction services” for resource
developers of a host country and in return the latter
grants resource development rights to the Chinese
enterprises. In addition, Chinese enterprises have
also developed a “four-in-one” development model
featuring “government promotion, development bank
financing, enterprise loaning and credit guaranty,”
effectively alleviating many difficulties during the
process of overseas resource development.
In practice, Sino-foreign joint ventures are the
primary development model adopted by Chinese
enterprises in overseas resource development. This
model makes it flexible for relevant enterprises to
invest overseas and at the same time helps mobilize
foreign enterprises to engage. The development
model of lease operation allows Chinese enterprises
to avoid complicated M&A processes and possible
cultural conflicts. This model is more suitable for
Chinese enterprises engaged in mineral exploitation
in countries with poor mining infrastructure,
particularly those in Africa. Resource exchange
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is a development model preferred by Chinese
enterprises familiar with a host country and capable
of maintaining long-term cooperation. The resource
exchange model is also more suitable for Chinese
enterprises specializing in large-scale resource
development projects.
2.5 Marine economy
When it comes to the Maritime Silk Road
construction, international maritime cooperation
is at the core. Since the 1980s, countries have been
increasing investments in the marine economy,
enabling continuous expansion of marine segments,
rapid progress in marine science & technology,
and the constant emergence of marine partnership
programs. The rapid development of this modern
marine economy forms a new driver for the
international cooperation between China and
countries along the Maritime Silk Road. The blue
economy, featuring global consensus and low
sensitivity, is leading the trend of international
maritime cooperation and will significantly
deepen China’s cooperation with ASEAN countries
and accelerate the development of the Maritime
Silk Road. Specifically, international maritime
cooperation along the Maritime Silk Road can be
developed through the following four approaches.
The first approach concerns the development
and utilization of marine resources. China should
strengthen trade ties in energy (oil, natural gas,
etc.) and mineral resources with related countries,
particularly those with huge oil and gas reserves
in the Middle East and West Asia. The second
approach concerns investment in marine resource
development. China should improve its investment
in marine resource development by participating in
the division of the global industry chain of oil & gas
development, and increasing input in procedures
like resource exploration, development, processing
and transportation. While enhancing cooperation
in development and deep-processing, China
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should encourage relevant enterprises to raise their
businesses to a higher level in the value chain. The
third approach concerns transportation of marine
resources. China should enhance cooperation with
related countries in re-building corridors for marine
energy transportation and ensuring energy supply
security. The fourth approach concerns cooperation
in marine science & technology. China should give
full play to its mighty technological strength to
deepen international communication and cooperation
in this regard and work together with related
countries to actively explore innovative technologies
in ocean engineering, sea water desalination,
marine environmental monitoring, offshore oil &
gas exploitation, offshore platform building, etc.
China should increase input in marine science &
technology, introduce more international academic
institutions specializing in studying marine economy
and technology, and hold more theme activities
(e.g. international forums on marine science &
technology) to enhance international cooperation in
marine science & technology and education.
In terms of port construction, China should
cooperate with key port cities along the Maritime Silk
Road to build port-based industry clusters and forge
a supporting platform for international cooperation
in production capacity. Industrial zones serve as an
important base for industrial transfers and industrial
agglomeration. During their process of going global,
Chinese enterprises have gradually developed an
innovative model of production capacity cooperation,
which enables a domestically dominant industry to
lead its related upstream and downstream industries
and “form a group” to go global. Those port-based
industry clusters take advantage of both seaport
convenience and hinterland economies. Through
cooperation between Chinese and foreign parties
at three levels (government, industry zone, and
enterprise), China should improve port and zone
infrastructures, integrate its industry chain with

others and promote international cooperation
in production capacity with countries along the
Maritime Silk Road.
Regarding maritime ecological conservation,
China can take the initiative to develop a mechanism
for international cooperation and coordination with
relevant countries to enhance China’s influence
along the Maritime Silk Road by participating in and
even taking the lead in the protection of the marine
environment. International marine cooperation, along
with the development of marine industries, inevitably
impose certain pressures on marine environments
and may even trigger conflicts of interest among
countries. For conf lict resolving pur poses,
international cooperation and coordination is in
urgent need. Regarding this, China can play a leading
role in formulating a convention on the conservation
of marine ecology along the Maritime Silk Road,
enhancing the management of marine environmental
law enforcement, and facilitating cooperation in
ecological conservation-related technology, talents
and information with countries along the Maritime
Silk Road.

3. Existing problems and suggestions
on policy
Recently, the Chinese government and relevant
authorities have introduced a range of policies
to boost the advancement of the Belt and Road
Initiative. According to our rough estimation,
authorities at the ministry & commission levels alone
have enacted at least 30 policy documents concerning
the advancement of the Belt and Road Initiative;
governments at provincial and municipal levels and
municipalities with independent planning status have
also enacted many more relevant policy documents.
Evidently, support from the Chinese government
is huge. Yet, most of these policy documents are of
“opinion” nature and therefore need more time to be
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truly implemented. In advancing the Maritime Silk
Road Construction, three major types of problems
have emerged, which are worth the full attention
from the Chinese government.
3.1 Three types of problems
3.1.1 Central Government’s one-way advancement,
local governments’ homogeneous competition, and
Chinese enterprises’ strong will & weak power
From the perspective of executive subject, major
problems that currently trouble the advancement
of the Belt and Road Initiative can be summarized
as “Central Government’s one-way advancement,
local governments’ homogeneous competition, and
Chinese enterprises’ strong will & weak power.” The
fruitful achievements of the Belt and Road Initiative
include many state-level strategic cooperation
agreements, memos, as well as a variety of assistance
projects, which are undertaken by two subjects, i.e.
relevant ministries / commissions and large centrallyadministered SOEs. The Belt and Road Initiative as a
major strategy is clearly shaped and advanced by the
Chinese government at the initial stages. However,
there is a lack of clear division of labor among
executive subjects at different levels. The Central
Government’s one-way advancement highlights
the insufficient participation of local governments
and creates doubts from some countries and foreign
media about the Belt and Road Initiative.
Local governments are enthusiastic about
participating in the Belt and Road Initiative but their
engagement remains superficial and formalistic and
easily causes homogeneous competition. So far,
no fewer than 30 cities have identified themselves
as the starting point of the Belt and Road. Worse
still, there are even inland cities claiming to be the
starting point of the Maritime Silk Road. First, most
of the local governments have no intention to truly
advance the Belt and Road Initiative in an in-depth
way. Rather, they just see it as an opportunity to gain
more policy support and resources. Second, local
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governments only have a superficial understanding
of how to engage in advancing this initiative and
fail to integrate local conditions and characteristics
to precisely position their industries in the Belt and
Road context.
Chinese enterprises are strong in will but weak
in power in advancing the Bet and Road Initiative.
To be fair, this initiative, proposed by the Chinese
government, means a rare strategic opportunity
for numerous domestic enterprises, many of which
are therefore very optimistic about their role in
the advancement of the Belt and Road Initiative.
In practice, however, a small number of centrallyadministered SOEs shoulder the primary missions,
while the majority of privately-run enterprises
can hardly align themselves with the Belt and
Road platform. The existing cooperation is mainly
developed in assistance projects and infrastructure
investments, which are completed by centrallyadministered SOEs under the leadership of the
Central Government. Under such circumstances, not
many privately-run enterprises have a willingness or
chance to participate. Besides, against the domestic
backdrop of de-leveraging and capital control,
privately-run enterprises are faced with financing
restrictions and bias, which further impair their
capability of going global.
3.1.2 Insufficient support from financial
institutions for the Maritime Silk Road construction
First, the level of participation varies from one
financial institution to another. When it comes to
participation in the Maritime Silk Road construction,
financial institutions which actively participate are
mainly policy banks (such as the Export-Import
Bank of China) and large state-owned banks (such
as Industrial and Commercial Bank of China). Other
commercial banks and non-banking institutions do
not have any substantial participation.
Second, non-economic factors have a significant
impact on financing policy, and economic consideration
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is far from enough. The existing collaborative
projects mainly fall into the categories of assistance
and infrastructure projects, which feature huge
capital needs, long construction cycles and low
returns. Accordingly, they must be provided with
policy-based long-term low-cost loans. Such loans
are accompanied with huge opportunity costs, high
prepayment risks and questionable sustainability.
Besides, they usually leave the wrong impression of
being “politically motivated.”
Third, financial services lack variety and need
to be diversified and localized. Given that current
financial support is mainly from policy banks and
large state-owned banks, such support is still given in
the form of bank loans, while other financial services,
such as insurance, funds and securities are yet to
come into play. Meanwhile, the abovementioned
financial support only allows capital to be injected
into the construction of the Maritime Silk Road.
Most domestic financial institutions have not started
“going global” (carrying out field research & setting
up branches), and cannot provide localized financial
services overseas.
Fourth, there is a lack of sufficient communications
among central banks of relevant countries. Since its
establishment, China’s Central Bank (People’s Bank
of China) has paid close attention to the monetary
policies of developed countries but overlooked full
communications with developing countries. Within
the cooperation framework of the Maritime Silk
Road, the major contribution of the People’s Bank of
China is arguably its signing of currency swaps with
most countries concerned. In a range of promising
areas (clearing mechanisms, risk management,
crisis response, monetary policy coordination,
green finance development, etc.), the People’s Bank
of China has barely developed any substantial
cooperation with relevant countries and lags in
platform construction. This explains why Chinese
financial institutions cannot effectively engage in

local businesses overseas.
3.1.3 Lack of a sound and complete talent pool
Due to the significant differences in development
status among countries along the Maritime Silk Road,
all projects, be it of an assistance or green investment
nature, must adapt to local conditions to fulfill
local needs. This requires relevant Chinese entities
to provide localized services overseas. However,
China’s talent reserve is still quite limited. Previously,
China focused on aligning its talent training with
the standards of developed countries without paying
due attention to relevant issue along the Maritime
Silk Road. Because of this, China’s talent cultivation
failed to catch up with the advancement of the Belt
and Road Initiative and this temporary talent gap
restricts the continuous advancement of the Maritime
Silk Road construction.
To be exact, four types of talent are in urgent
need. The first type is financial professional with
international vision, familiar with the complicated
operation modes of international capital markets.
The second type is practical talent capable of
addressing real matters in practice. The third
type is interdisciplinary talent with high political
awareness and capable of promptly identifying
non-economic risks. The fourth type is regionspecific talent with interdisciplinary backgrounds
and research experience in the language, culture
and social customs of a particular country or region.
Profound vision, good practice and local knowledge
are necessities for talents who want to grasp more
strategic opportunities, effectively avoid economic
and non-economic risks and help Chinese enterprises
provide more localized services when expanding
markets abroad. It is true that China has accumulated
a great deal of valuable development experience, but
it may not be easily applied to a foreign country. For
example, China’s industrial policies and experience in
industry zone construction are worth learning from,
but before the actual introduction of these policies
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and experience consideration must be given to local
labor competence, resource endowment, and social
systems. There is no “one-size-fits-all” solution.
To properly address the above three problems,
the Chinese government should make corresponding
adjustments and improvements to better coordinate
“Central Government―local government―
enterprise” relationships, increase financial support,
improve research work, cultivate talent and highlight
oceanic features. In doing so, it is expected to further
advance the Maritime Silk Road construction.
3.2 Countermeasures and suggestions
3.2.1 Properly controlling the advancement
speed and coordinating “Central Government—
local government—enterprise” relationships in
participation.
As a major strategic concept, the Belt and
Road Initiative cannot be achieved in a short time.
In advancing the Belt and Road Initiative, more
importance should be attached to the overall grasp
of long-term performance, rather than specific shortterm results. China should properly control the speed
of strategic advancement, attach less importance
to short-term results, specify job assignments of
different executive subjects, and coordinate “Central
Government―local government―enterprise”
relationships in participation.
The Central Government should strengthen
their control of strategic orientation, create a
favorable political environment at the macro-level,
and pay less attention to specific matters and shortterm tasks. The Central Government should focus
on the overall strategic positioning and layout of
the Belt and Road Initiative, delegate decisionmaking and planning powers to relevant ministries
and commissions, as well as local governments.
Meanwhile, the Central Government should also
further enhance mutual political trust with relevant
countries and forge a favorable political environment
for Chinese enterprises to engage in the Belt and
36

Road Initiative. There should be a clear standard
that distinguishes existing assistance projects from
ordinary infrastructure construction projects. The
Central Government should consciously reduce
assistance, depoliticize overseas projects and
further highlight the joint efforts required in the
advancement of the Belt and Road Initiative. In
contrast, local governments should consider their
local conditions to accurately identify their industrial
advantages and engage in targeted areas during the
Belt and Road construction. What matters most
for this grand cause is not its starting point, but its
“key dots.” When it comes to labor division and
collaboration along the international industry chain,
local governments should give full play to their own
advantages, enhance their strength in producing
competitive products, and subsequently fulfill the
real needs of the Belt and Road construction. Only
by doing so can local governments expect to truly
grasp the strategic opportunities brought about by
the Belt and Road Initiative, give full play to their
comparative advantages and boost their economies.
From a panoramic view, China should reform its
management system, set up supporting funds, and
encourage more privately-run enterprises to engage
in the Belt and Road Initiative. It should introduce
targeted supporting policies concerning finance &
taxation, foreign exchange management, financing,
etc. to stimulate privately-run enterprises to go global
and contribute to the Belt and Road construction.
3.2.2 Increasing support from f inancial
institutions for the Maritime Silk Road construction
in an all-round way
First, China should enable financial institutions
to play a bigger role in this cause. Banks should
continue to play the leading role in this regard and
commercial banks should be encouraged to provide
more credit aids and clearing services for projects
related to the Maritime Silk Road. China should
also further lift the restrictions on the foreign loans
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of commercial banks, encourage them to invest
in projects related to the Maritime Silk Road, and
improve the risk evaluation and control of relevant
projects. It should also upgrade settlement platforms,
promote cooperation between commercial banks,
and cooperation between commercial banks and the
AIIB & Silk Road Fund, and develop a settlement
system and a risk prevention system conforming to
project reality. While promoting project resource
integration and information sharing among
commercial banks and improving information
disclosure, China should raise more capital for
relevant projects through innovative attempts such
as syndicated loans. China should strengthen its
cooperation with local governments and the banks of
countries where relevant projects are located, enhance
communications with them, improve the convenience
of inter-bank lending, currency settlements and other
businesses, and establish bilateral and multilateral
mechanisms of risk prevention and treatment. Based
on the existing domestic laws and regulations, China
should encourage the insurance sector to actively
explore new service models for projects related to
the Maritime Silk Road. For example, a new pilot
insurance model, which integrates insurance products
with insurance investments, has been developed and
is expected to provide services like construction,
liability and credit insurance. Moreover, China also
encourages insurance companies with sufficient
strength to provide risk management services
for major infrastructure construction, equipment
manufacturing, etc., improve real economic
risk resistance capacity and attract investments
in relevant projects. By extensively drawing on
domestic investment experience, domestic insurance
institutions can take the initiative to raise fund for
infrastructure construction and other projects in
countries along the Maritime Silk Road by means of
creditors’ investment plans, equity plans and other
modes.

Second, China should enhance cooperation
with monetary authorities of relevant countries.
Based on the existing platforms and cooperation
mechanisms, the central banks of relevant countries
should work together to build bilateral and
multilateral mechanisms of financial cooperation
and coordination and continue to promote bilateral
agreements concerning currency swaps and local
currency settlements in bilateral trade to lower
transaction costs. The financial markets of relevant
regions should strive for better connectivity. It
is necessary to encourage domestic financial
institutions to establish a regular communication
mechanism with corresponding overseas financial
institutions and multilateral financial institutions.
China should further open its bond market to
accelerate its development, pave the way for countries
along the Maritime Silk Road to issue RMB-based
bonds in offshore markets, and work together with
these countries to build a multi-layered Asian bond
market. Moreover, China should also build and
improve its financial regulatory system and an
international financial cooperation system. It should
enhance communications and coordination with the
regulatory authorities of countries along the Maritime
Silk Road by establishing regular mechanisms such
as conferences of central bank governors. It should
also improve its regulatory consistency concerning
major issues and gradually build a highly efficient
mechanism of regulation and coordination. In
addition, it should strengthen cooperation among
credit administrations of relevant countries, expand
information exchanges among rating agencies,
promote the construction of an integrated credit
system, and build an early-warning mechanism and
a cooperative mechanism of risk management for the
financial development of the Maritime Silk Road.
Third, China should prevent any possible
financial risks. The first potential financial risk
is incurred by local customs, particularly those in
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the Islamic world. Islamic finance attaches great
importance to the real economy. It allows credit but
strictly prohibits risk-free interests and speculation
and denies contracts with uncertain terms. China
should take the initiative to explore a financial
mechanism that simultaneously accommodates
Islamic finance and traditional finance, manage
Islamic finance in accordance with its unique
characteristics, and develop financial products
conforming to Islamic doctrines for Islamic
countries. The second potential financial risk is
possible loss in investment income incurred by
exchange fluctuations. The currencies of countries
along the Maritime Silk Road usually feature low
universality and value fluctuations. Besides, some of
those countries are faced with complicated political
climates and political turmoil, which is highly likely
to affect their exchange stability. Relevant Chinese
financial institutions and authorities should promote
financial services and product innovations to help
relevant enterprises deal with possible exchange risks.
The third potential financial risk lies in the sovereign
credit of some countries along the Maritime Silk
Road. China should promote risk prevention and
information sharing among those countries, help
Chinese rating and credit information agencies
“go global,” seek cross-border cooperation and
development, and establish necessary national earlywarning and rating mechanisms. More efforts should
be made to improve regional networks of financial
security and establish risk/crisis-response systems for
countries along the Maritime Silk Road.
3.2.3 Cultivating specialized talent teams
First, China should establish a joint-training
mechanism in collaboration with higher institutions
and enterprises. It should encourage specialized
higher institutions (such as ocean universities)
in China to cooperate with leading enterprises
of relevant industries to run certain programs. It
should also encourage China’s quality vocational
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institutions, in collaboration with sectors like highspeed train and telecom operations, to expand
overseas markets, explore more models of overseas
cooperation in education, work together with foreign
partners to establish vocational institutions and
training centers, jointly develop teaching resources
and projects, provide multi-level vocational education
and training, and cultivate talents in dire need for
countries along the Maritime Silk Road. Second,
China should attach more importance to field trips
and research during the process of talent cultivation.
The Chinese government should establish special
aid funds to support the Maritime Silk Road-themed
research projects, appropriately relax the control
of relevant project funds, and enable talent teams
in related fields to make field research in countries
along the Maritime Silk Road. This field research
should integrate “going global” with “bringing in,”
which means to send domestic talents to countries
along the Maritime Silk Road for further research
and at the same time to invite talents from those
countries to China for the same purposes. Third,
China should promote exchange and communications
among academic institutions and think tanks
of relevant countries. Along the Maritime Silk
Road are numerous countries and regions, whose
political, economic and religious backgrounds vary
greatly. Given this, “talent cultivation behind closed
doors” is bound to fail. China should enhance its
communications with countries and regions along
the Maritime Silk Road, and establish a regular
mechanism of cooperation with relevant subjects
(government authorities, academic institutions,
think tanks, enterprises, etc.) of these countries
and regions. Domestic scholars should strengthen
communications and cooperation with research
fellows from relevant countries, and promote mutual
learning, mutual understanding and the exchange
of needed knowledge. Chinese higher institutions
should place more emphasis on the cultivation of
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talents specialized in regional studies and encourage
top domestic talents to pay academic visits to partner
institutions and universities in countries along the
Maritime Silk Road. China should also facilitate

more cooperation in exchange education with
relevant countries and invite more students from
those countries to study in Chinese universities and
colleges.
(Translator: Wu Lingwei; Editor: Jia Fengrong)

This paper has been translated and reprinted with the permission of International Economic Review,
No. 5, 2017.
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